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The recent literature on evaluating social programs ﬁnds that persons (or ﬁrms or institutions) respond to the same policy
diﬀerently (Heckman, 2001). The distribution of these responses is usually summarized by some mean. A variety of means
can be deﬁned depending on the conditioning variables used. Diﬀerent means answer diﬀerent policy question. There is no
uniquely deﬁned “eﬀect” of a policy.
The research reported here moves beyond means as descriptions of policy outcomes and determines joint counterfactual
distributions of outcomes for alternative interventions. From knowledge of the joint distributions of counterfactual outcomes
it is possible to determine the proportion of people who beneﬁt or lose from making a particular policy choice (taking or not
taking particular treatments), the origin and destination outcomes of those who change states because of policy interventions
and the amount of gain (or loss) from various policy choices by persons at diﬀerent deciles of an initial prepolicy distribution.
Our work builds on previous research by Heckman and Smith (1993, 1998) and Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997) that
uses experimental data to bound or point-identify joint counterfactual distributions. We extend the analysis of Aakvik,
Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2003) who use factor models to identify counterfactual distributions to consider indicators for
unobservables, implications from choice theory and to exploit the beneﬁts of panel data.
From the joint distribution of counterfactuals, it is possible to generate all mean, median or other quantile gains, to identify
all pairwise treatment eﬀects in a multi-outcome setting, to determine how much of the variability in returns across persons
comes from variability in destination distributions and how much comes from variability in opportunity distributions, and to
evaluate the option value created by social programs. Using the joint distribution of counterfactuals, it is possible to develop
a more nuanced understanding of the distributional impacts of public policies, and to move beyond comparisons of aggregate
overall distributions induced by diﬀerent policies to consider how people in diﬀerent portions of an initial distribution are
aﬀected by public policy. We extend the analysis of DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) to consider self-selection as a
determinant of aggregate wage and earnings distributions.
Using our methods, we reanalyze the model of Willis and Rosen (1979), who apply the Roy model (1951) to the economics
of education. We extend their model to account for uncertainty in the returns to education. We also distinguish between
present value income maximizing and utility maximizing evaluations of schooling choices and we estimate the net non-
pecuniary beneﬁt of attending college. We use information on the choices of agents to determine how much of the ex post
heterogeneity in the return to schooling is forecastable at the time agents make their schooling choices. This procedure
extends the analysis of Flavin (1981) to a discrete choice setting. This allows us to identify the eﬀect of uncertainty on
schooling choices. Ex ante, there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the returns to schooling (in utils or dollars). Ex
post, 8% of college graduates regret going to college.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the essential idea underlying the identiﬁcation strategy used in
this paper and how our approach is related to previous work. Section 3 presents a general policy evaluation framework for
counterfactual distributions with multiple treatments followed over time. The strategy pursued in this paper is based on
using low dimensional factors to generate distributions of potential outcomes. We show how our methods generalize the
method of matching by allowing some or all of the variables that generate the conditional independence assumed in matching
1to be unobserved by the analyst. Section 4 introduces the factor models used in this paper. Section 5 presents proofs of
semiparametric identiﬁcation. Section 6 applies the analysis to extend the Rosen-Willis model of college choice to account
for uncertainty and to estimate the information about future earnings available to agents at the time schooling decisions are
made. Section 7 reports estimates of the distributions of returns to schooling, the components unforecastable by the agent
at the time schooling decisions are made, and the nonpecuniary net beneﬁts from attending college. Section 8 applies our
estimates to evaluate a reform to the U.S. educational system. It illustrates the power of our method to lift the commonly
invoked Veil of Ignorance and move beyond aggregate distributions of outcomes to understand the distributional consequences
of public policies. Section 9 concludes. We ﬁrst provide a brief introduction to the literature to put this paper in context.
2 Estimating Distributions of Counterfactual Outcomes
In order to place the approach used in this paper in the context of an emerging literature on heterogeneous treatment eﬀects,
it is helpful to motivate our work by a two outcome, two-treatment cross section model. For simplicity, in this section it is
assumed that the outcomes are continuous random variables. The analysis in the rest of this paper is for multiple treatments
and multiple outcomes followed over time and the outcomes may be discrete, continuous or mixed discrete-continuous.
The agent has two possible counterfactual states (Y0,Y 1). The states are schooling levels in our empirical analysis. X is
a determinant of the counterfactual states (Y0,Y 1),S=1if Y1 is observed; S =0otherwise. Observed Y = SY1 +(1−S)Y0.
There may be an instrument (or set of instruments) Z such that (Y0,Y 1) ⊥ ⊥ Z | X and Pr(S =1| Z,X) depends on Z for
all X (i.e., it is a nontrivial function of Z) and Z is in the choice probability but not the outcome equation. We show below
that such a Z is not strictly required in our approach. The standard treatment eﬀect model assumes policies (Z)t h a ta ﬀect
choices of treatment but not potential outcomes (Y0,Y 1). General equilibrium eﬀects are ignored.5
The goal of our analysis is to recover F(Y0,Y 1 | X). As noted in Heckman (1992), Heckman and Smith (1993, 1998)
and Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997), from this joint distribution it is possible to estimate the proportion of people
who beneﬁt (in terms of gross gains) from participation in the program (Pr(Y1 >Y 0 | X)), gains to participants at selected
levels of the no treatment, (F(Y1 − Y0 | Y0 = y0,X)), or treatment distribution (F(Y1 − Y0 | Y1 = y1,X)), the option value
of social programs, and a variety of other questions that can be answered using distributions of potential outcomes including
conventional mean treatment eﬀects and quantiles of the gains (Y1 − Y0) for those who receive treatment.
The problem of recovering joint distributions arises because we observe Y0 if S =0and Y1 if S =1 .T h u s w e k n o w
F(Y0 | S =0 ,X),F (Y1 | S =1 ,X) but not F(Y0 | X) or F(Y1 | X). In addition, we do not observe the pair (Y0,Y 1) for
anyone. Thus we cannot directly obtain F(Y1,Y 0 | S,X) from the data. Additional information is required to identify the
joint distribution.
There are two separate problems. The ﬁrst is a selection problem. From F(Y1 | S =1 ,X ) and F(Y0 | S =0 ,X ), under
what conditions can one recover F(Y1 | X) and F(Y0 | X), respectively? The second problem is how to construct the joint
distribution F(Y0,Y 1 | X) from the two marginals.
Assuming that the selection problem can be surmounted, classical probability results due to Fréchet (1951) and Hoeﬀding
(1940) show how to bound F(Y1,Y 0 | S, X) using the marginal distributions. In practice these bounds are very wide, and
the inferences based on the bounding distributions are often not useful.6
2The traditional (pre-1985) approach to program evaluation assumed that F(Y0,Y 1 | X) is degenerate because conditional
on X, Y1 and Y0 are deterministically related:
(1) Y1 ≡ Y0 + ∆(X) .
This is the “common eﬀect” assumption that postulates that conditional on X, treatment has the same eﬀect on everyone.
From the means of F(Y0 | S =0 ,X ) and F(Y1 | S =1 ,X ) corrected for selection, one can identify E(∆( X)) = E(Y1 |
X) − E(Y0 | X). ( See Heckman and Robb, 1985; 1986 (reprinted 2000) for a variety of estimators for this case and for
discussion of more general cases.) Heckman and Smith (1993, 1998) and Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997) relax this
assumption by assuming perfect ranking across the counterfactual outcome distributions. Assuming absolutely continuous
marginal distributions, they postulate that quantiles are perfectly ranked so Y1 = F
−1
1,X(F0,X(Y0)) where F1,X = F1(y1 |
X) and F0,X = F0(y0 | X). This assumption generates a deterministic relationship which turns out to be the tight upper
bound of the Fréchet bounds. An alternative assumption is that people are perfectly inversely ranked so the best in one
distribution is the worst in the other: Y1 = F
−1
1,X(1 − F0,X(Y0). This is the tight Fréchet lower bound. More generally,
one could associate quantiles across distributions more freely. Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997) use Markov transition
kernels which stochastically map quantiles of one distribution into quantiles of another. They deﬁne a pair of Markov kernels
M(y1,y 0 | X) and ˜ M(y0,y 1 | X) such that
F1(y1 | X)=
Z
M(y1,y 0 | X)dF0(y0 | X)
F0(y0 | X)=
Z
˜ M(y0,y 1 | X)dF1(y1 | X).
Allowing these operators to be degenerate produces a variety of deterministic transformations, including the two previously
presented, as special cases of a general mapping. Diﬀerent (M, ˜ M) pairs produce diﬀerent joint distributions.7 These
stochastic or deterministic transformations supply the missing information needed to construct the joint distributions.
A perfect ranking (or perfect inverse ranking) assumption is convenient. It generalizes the perfect-ranking, constant-
shift assumptions implicit in the conventional literature. It allows us to apply conditional quantile methods to estimate the
distributions of gains.8 However, it imposes a strong arbitrary dependence across distributions. Our empirical analysis shows
that this assumption is at odds with data on the returns to education.
An alternative approach to constructing joint distributions due to Heckman and Honoré (1990), Heckman (1990) and
Heckman and Smith (1998) uses the economics of the model by assuming that
(2) S =1 ( µs(Z) ≥ es)
where µs(Z) is a mean net utility, Z ⊥ ⊥ es, and “1” is a logical indicator =1if the argument is valid; =0otherwise. In
3addition they assume that
Y1 = µ1(X)+U1, E(U1)=0
Y0 = µ0(X)+U0,E (U0)=0
where (U1,U 0) ⊥ ⊥ X, Z.9 In the special case where S =1 (Y1 ≥ Y0) (the Roy model), Heckman and Honoré (1990) present
conditions on µ1, µ0 and X such that F(U1,U0) and µ1(X), µ0(X) and hence F(Y0,Y1|X) are identiﬁed from data on choices
(S), characteristics (X) and observed outcomes Y = SY1 +(1−S)Y0. Buera (2002) extends their approach to non-separable
models with weaker exclusion restrictions.
Heckman (1990) and Heckman and Smith (1998) consider more general decision rules of the form (2) under the assumption
that (Z,X) ⊥ ⊥ (U0,U 1,e s) and the further conditions that (i) µs(Z) is a nontrivial function of Z conditional on X and (ii)
full support assumptions on µ1( X),µ 0(X) and µs(Z), they establish nonparametric identiﬁcation of F(U0,e s),F(U1,e s) up
to a scale for ρs and µ1 (X),µ 0 (X) and µs(Z).10 Hence, under their assumptions, they can identify F( Y0,S | X,Z) and
F ( Y1, S | X,Z) but not the joint distributions F( Y0,Y 1| X) or F( Y0,Y 1,S| X, Z) unless the U0,U 1,e s dependence is
restricted.
Aakvik, Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2003) build on Heckman (1990) and Heckman and Smith (1998) by postulating a
factor structure connecting (U0,U 1,e s). Our work builds on their analysis so we describe its essential idea. Suppose that the
unobservables follow a factor structure:
U0 = α0θ + ε0, U1 = α1θ + ε1,e s = αsθ + εs
where θ ⊥ ⊥ (ε0,ε 1,ε s) and the ε’s are mutually independent. In their setup, θ is a scalar. θ can be an unobservable trait
like ability or motivation that aﬀects all outcomes. Because the factor loadings, α0,α 1,α s,m a yb ed i ﬀerent, the factors may
aﬀect outcomes and choices diﬀerently. Recall that one can identify F(U0,e s) and F(U1,e s) under the conditions speciﬁed
in Heckman and Smith (1998) and generalized in Theorems 1-3 below. Thus, one can identify COV(U0,e s)=α0αs σ2
θ and
COV(U1,e s)=α1αsσ2
θ assuming ﬁnite variances and assuming E(θ)=0 ,E (θ
2)=σ2
θ. With some normalizations (e.g.,
σ2
θ =1 , αs =1 ) , under conditions speciﬁed in Section 4.1, we can nonparametrically identify the distribution of θ and the
distributions of ε0,ε 1,ε s (up to scale of the standard deviation of es,σes). Aakvik, Heckman and Vytlacil (1999) also present
alternative identifying assumptions. With the α1,α 0,α s, and the distributions of θ,ε0,ε 1,ε s in hand, we can construct the
joint distributions of F(Y0,Y 1 | X).
This paper builds on this basic idea and extends it to a more general setting. We consider a model with multiple factors,
multiple treatments and multiple time periods. Outcome measures may be discrete or continuous. We follow the psychometric
literature by adjoining measurement equations to outcome equations to pin down the distribution of θ. With this framework
we can estimate all pairwise treatment eﬀects in a multiple outcome setting. We also consider the beneﬁts for identiﬁcation
of having access to measurements on vector θ which are observed for all persons independent of their treatment status. This
model integrates the LISREL framework of Jöreskog (1977) into a model of discrete choice and a model of multiple treatment
eﬀects. We develop this model in Section 4 after presenting a more general framework for counterfactuals and treatment
4eﬀects in a multi-outcome, possibly dynamic setting.
3 Policy Counterfactuals for the Multiple Outcome Case
This section deﬁnes policy counterfactuals for the multiple treatment case. For speciﬁcity, think of states as schooling levels
and diﬀerent ages as periods in the life cycle. Associated with each state s (schooling level) is a vector of outcomes at age a
for person ω ∈ Ω (a set of indices) with elements:
(3) Ys,a(ω) s =1 ,..., ¯ S, a =1 ,..., ¯ A
where there are ¯ S states and ¯ A ages. Associated with each person ω is a vector X(ω) of explanatory variables. These may
be diﬀerent at diﬀerent ages and in diﬀerent states.
The ceteris paribus eﬀect (or individual treatment eﬀect) of a change from state s at age a to state s0 at age a00 is
(4) ∆((s,a),(s0,a 00)) = Ys,a(ω) − Ys0,a00(ω).
Since it is usually not possible to observe the same person in both s and s0, analysts often focus on estimating various
population level versions of these parameters for diﬀerent conditioning sets.11 In this paper, we estimate distributions of
potential outcomes and parameters derived from these distributions, including the Average Treatment Eﬀect
ATE ((s,a),(s0,a 00),x)=E(Ys,a − Ys0,a00 | X = x)
and the Marginal Treatment Eﬀect, the average gain from moving from s to s0 for those on the margin of indiﬀerence between
s and s0. We are interested in determining the joint distributions of the counterfactual distributions of ∆((s,a),(s0,a 00),x)
for diﬀerent conditioning sets.
Associated with each treatment or state (schooling choice) is a choice equation associated with a level of lifetime utility:
Vs(ω), s =1 ,...,¯ S. Utilities are assumed to be absolutely continuous. Agents select treatment states (schooling levels) ˜ s to
maximize utility:





Associated with choices are explanatory variables Z(ω). A distinctive feature of the econometric approach to program eval-
uation is that it evaluates policies both in terms of objective outcomes (the Ys,a(ω)) and in terms of subjective outcomes
(the utilities of the agents making the choices). Both subjective and objective evaluations are useful in evaluating policy.
Choice theory is also used to guide and rationalize speciﬁc choices of estimators. It enables us to separate out variability
from intrinsic uncertainty, as we demonstrate below.
This framework is suﬃciently general to encompass a variety of choice processes including sequential dynamic programming
models12 and the ordered choice models,13 as well as more general unordered choice models. We let Ds =1if treatment s is
5selected. Since there are
_




In this notation, the marginal treatment eﬀect for choices s and s0 is
(6) MTE
Vs→Vs0
(a,V s,s0)=E(Ys,a − Ys
0,a | Vs = Vs0 = V s,s0 ≥ Vj,j6= s,s0).
It is the average gain of going from s0 to s at age a for persons indiﬀerent between s and s0 given that s and s0 are the best
two choices in the choice set.











f(Vs,V s0 | Vs = Vs0 = V s,s0 ≥ Vj,j 6= s,s0)/ψ
¢
the weighted average of the pairwise marginal treatment eﬀects from all source states to s with the weights being the density





f(Vs,V s0 | Vs = Vs0 = V s,s0 ≥ Vj,j6= s,s0)
is a normalizing constant (the population proportion of people at all margins), assumed positive.
We next present a framework for estimating the distributions of the treatment eﬀects and the parameters derived from
them, which allows us to estimate the parameters deﬁned in this section as well as other parameters. To simplify notation,
we suppress the ω argument in the rest of the paper.
4 Factor Structure Models
The strategy adopted in this paper identiﬁes the distribution of counterfactuals by postulating a low dimensional set of factors
θ so that, conditional on them, and the covariates X and Z, the Ys,a and Vs are jointly independent. The distributions of the θ
are nonparametrically identiﬁed under conditions speciﬁed below. With these distributions in hand, it is possible to construct
the distribution of counterfactuals. Under the conditions speciﬁed in Section 5, it is possible with low dimensional factors
to nonparametrically identify the counterfactual distributions and to estimate all of the treatment eﬀects in the literature
suitably expanded to multidimensional versions.
Throughout this paper we analyze a separable-in-the-errors system. Thus preferences can be described by
(8) Vs = µs(Z) − es s =1 ,..,S.
It is conventional to assume that µs(Z)=Z0βs with s =1 ,..,S. Linear approximations to value functions are advocated
6by Heckman (1981), Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) and developed systematically in Geweke, Houser and Keane (2001). Our
approach does not require linearity but critically relies on separability between the deterministic portion of the model and
the errors es. Following Heckman (1981), Cameron and Heckman (1987, 1998), and McFadden (1984), write
(9) es = α0
sθ + εs
where θ is a K × 1 vector of mutually independent factors (θ  ⊥ ⊥θ 0, 6=  0)a n dd e ﬁne εs =( ε1,...,εS)
(10) θ⊥ ⊥εs εs⊥ ⊥εs0 ∀s,s0 =1 ,..., ¯ S and s 6= s0
E(θ)=0; E(εs)=0 ; Dk =1if Vk is maximal in {Vs(Z)}
S
s=1 .14
Potential outcomes at age a, Y ∗
s,a, are stochastically dependent among each other and the choices only through their





Potential outcomes are separable in observables and unobservables. A linear-in-parameters version writes µs,a(X)=
X0βs,a. Deﬁne εY =(ε1,1,...,ε1,A,...,εs,1,...,εs,A,...,εS,A)
(12) θ⊥ ⊥εY
(13) εs,a⊥ ⊥εs0,a00; ∀ s 6= s0, ∀ a,a00
and
(14) εs,a⊥ ⊥εs0 ∀ s0,s =1 ,..., ¯ S; a =1 ,..., ¯ A.
(15) (Z,X)⊥ ⊥(θ,εY ,εs)
The Y ∗
s,a may be vector valued.
When the outcome is continuous, the observed value corresponds to the latent variable (Ys,a = Y ∗
s,a). When the outcome
is discrete (e.g., employment status), we interpret Y ∗
s,a in (11) as a latent variable. In that case, Ys,a is an indicator function
Ys,a =1 ( Y ∗
s,a ≥ 0). Tobit and other censored cases can be accommodated. Other mixed discrete-continuous cases can be
handled in a conventional fashion.15
One motivation for the factor representation is that agents may observe θ (or variables that span θ)a n da c to ni t( e.g.,
7choose schooling levels), while the econometrician does not observe θ. Below, we present methods for testing whether agents
observe θ. Conditional on θ and X, the potential outcomes are independent. If (12)-(14) accurately describe the data
generating process, we obtain the conditional independence assumptions used in matching (see, e.g., Cochran and Rubin,
1973; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).
In matching it is assumed that Ys,a ⊥ ⊥Ds | X = x,Z = z,θ = θ for all s.16 From this assumption, we can identify ATE
from the right hand side terms which are observed outcomes if θ is observable:
E(Ys,a − Ys0,a | X,Z,θ)=E(Ys,a | X,Z,θ,D s =1 )− E(Ys0,a | X,Z,θ,D s0 =1 )
and treatment on the treated, ATE and MTE are the same parameter conditional on θ, X and Z (Heckman, 2001; Aakvik,
Heckman and Vytlacil, 2003). Our framework diﬀers from matching by allowing the factors that generate the conditional
independence that underlies matching to be unobserved by the analyst. In this sense, our approach is more robust than
matching. The price for this robustness is the assumed independence between θ and (X,Z).
Factor structure models are notorious for being identiﬁed by arbitrary normalization and exclusion restrictions. To
reduce this arbitrariness and render greater interpretability to estimates obtained from our model, we adjoin a measurement
system to choice equations (8) and outcome system (11). Various measurements can be interpreted as indicators of speciﬁc
factors (e.g., test scores may proxy ability). Having measurements on the factors also facilitates identiﬁability under weaker
assumptions as we demonstrate in Section 5. However, measurements are not strictly required for identiﬁcation. Outcome,
measurement, and choice equations are interchangeable sources of identiﬁcation in a sense that we make precise in Section 5.
Consider a system of L measurements on the K factors, initially assumed to be for continuous outcome measures:
M1 = µ1(X)+β11θ1 + .... + β1KθK + εM
1 (16)
. . .




L ),E (εM)=0 and where we assume θ =( θ1,...,θK)⊥ ⊥(εM
1 ,...,εM
L ), θ⊥ ⊥εM, θ⊥ ⊥εs, εs⊥ ⊥εM,ε M
i ⊥ ⊥εM
j
∀i 6= j,a n di, j =1 ,...,L. For interpretability, we assume θi ⊥ ⊥θj, ∀i 6= j, i,j =1 ,...,K. We develop the case with
discrete measurements on latent continuous variables in Section 5. One can think of the outcome measures as an s-dependent
measurement system. The measures (16) are the same across all s.
Measurement system (16) allows for fallible measures of outcomes. Thus in our schooling choice analysis, we are not
committed to the infallibility of test scores as measurements of ability. Measurement system (16) allows us to proxy unob-
servables accounting for measurement error using the replacement function concept of Heckman and Robb (1985) and hence
enables us to improve on the proxy procedure of Olley and Pakes (1996) which assumes no measurement error.
Choice Equations
Our analysis applies to both ordered discrete choice models and unordered choice models as analyzed by Cameron and
Heckman (1998) and Hansen, Heckman and Mullen (2001). In this paper, we focus attention on a new ordered choice model.
8Other choice models can easily be accommodated in our framework and richer models are a source of additional identifying
information.17
For an ordered discrete choice model, let utility index I be written as
(17) I = ϕ(Z)+εW,ε W = γ0θ + εI,σ 2
W = γ0 X






θ is the covariance matrix of θ. A linear-in-parameters version which is the one developed in this
paper writes ϕ(Z)=Zη. Choices are generated by index ϕ(Z) falling in various intervals.
D1 =1 if −∞<I≤ c1 (18)
Ds =1 ⇔ cs−1 <I≤ cs s =2 ,..., ¯ S − 1
DS =1 if cS−1 <I<∞.
Thus c0 = −∞. It is required that cs ≥ cs−1 for all s ≥ 2. This is a special case of random utility model (8) in which states
are ordered and pairwise contrasts possess a special structure.18
We can parameterize the cs to be functions of state-speciﬁc regressors, e.g., cs = Qsρs w h e r ew er e s t r i c tcs ≥ cs−1.W e
could also follow a suggestion in Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) and incorporate one sided shocks νs and work with
stochastic thresholds ˜ cs in place of cs :˜ cs = cs + νs,s =1 ,...,S − 1 where νs ≥ νs−1 and νs ≥ 0.19
Conditioning on Qs = qs,s=1 ,..., ¯ S, and assuming that the Support(Z | Qs = qs,s=1 ,..., ¯ S)=Support(εW),w ec a n
apply the conditions presented in Cameron and Heckman (1998) to identify the distribution of FεW,η, c1,....,cS−1 up to
scale σW. We can nonparametrically identify cs(Qs) over the support of Qs under conditions speciﬁed in Theorem 2 below.
Unlike the case of the more general unordered discrete choice model (see Elrod and Keane, 1995; Ben Akiva et al., 2001),
without further restrictions on the distribution of εW, we cannot identify the factors generating εW using only choice data.
Hansen, Heckman and Mullen (2003) present an analysis parallel to the one given here for a multinomial probit model. In
that model, the distributions of factors can be identiﬁed from choice data.
4.1 Models for Factors
Factor models are notorious for being identiﬁed through arbitrary assumptions about how factors enter outcome and choice
equations. This led to their disuse after their introduction into economics by Jöreskog and Goldberger (1972), Goldberger
(1972), Chamberlain and Griliches (1975) and Chamberlain (1977a, b).
The essential identiﬁcation problem in factor analysis is clearly stated by Anderson and Rubin (1956). If there are L
measurements on K mutually independent factors arrayed in a vector θ,w em a yw r i t eo u t c o m e sG in terms of latent variables
θ as
(19) G = µ + Λθ + ε
where G is L × 1, θ ⊥ ⊥ ε, µ is an L × 1 vector of means, which may depend on X, θ is K × 1, ε is L × 1 and Λ is L × K.
9εi ⊥ ⊥ εj,i , j=1 ,.,L,i6= j.A tt h i sp o i n t ,ε is a general notation which will be linked to speciﬁc ε’s in Section 5. Even if
θi ⊥ ⊥ θj, i 6= j,i,j =1 ..,K,t h em o d e li su n d e r i d e n t i ﬁed. As we shall see, the G in this paper is a more general system than
the system based solely on measurements invariant across states M so we distinguish (16) and (19). It will include M as well
as state dependent outcomes (Y ∗
s,a) and the indices generating choice equations.
Using only the information in the covariance matrices, as is common in factor analysis,
(20) COV(G)=ΛΣθΛ0 + Dε
where Σθ is a diagonal matrix of the variances of the factors, and Dε is a diagonal matrix of the “uniqueness” variances. We
observe G but not θ or ε, and we seek to identify Λ, Σθ and Dε. Without some restrictions, this is clearly an impossible task.
Conventional factor-analytic models make assumptions to identify parameters. The restriction that the components of θ are
independent is one restriction that we have already made, but it is not enough. The diagonals of COV (G) combine elements
of Dε with parameters from the rest of the model. Once those other parameters are determined, the diagonals identify Dε.
Accordingly, we can only rely on the
L(L−1)
2 non-diagonal elements to identify the K variances (assuming θi ⊥ ⊥ θj, ∀i 6= j),
and the L×K factor loadings. Since the scale of each θi is arbitrary, one factor loading devoted to each factor is normalized
to unity to set the scale. Accordingly, we require that
L(L − 1)
2 | {z }
Number of oﬀ-diagonal covariance elements
≥ (L × K − K)
| {z }




L ≥ 2K +1
is a necessary condition for identiﬁcation.
The strategy pursued in this paper is transparent and assumes that there are two or more measurements devoted exclusively
to factor θ1, and at least three measurements that are generated by factor θ1, two or more further measurements devoted
only to factors θ1 and θ2, with at least three measurements on θ2, and so forth in blocks of at least two. This strategy is
motivated by our access to psychometric and longitudinal data. Test scores may only proxy ability (θ1). Other measurements
may proxy only (θ1,θ 2). Measurements on earnings from panel data may proxy (θ1,θ 2,θ 3), etc.
Order G under this assumption so that we get the following pattern for Λ ( w ea s s u m et h a tt h ed i s p l a y e dλij are not zero):
10(21) Λ =

                           

1000
. . . ... ... 0
λ21 000
. . . ... ... 0
λ31 100
. . . ... ... 0
λ41 λ42 00
. . . ... ... 0
λ51 λ52 10
. . . ... ... 0
λ61 λ62 λ63 0
. . . ... ... 0
λ71 λ72 λ73 1
. . . 0 ... 0
λ81 λ82 λ83 λ84
. . . 0 ... 0
... ... ... ...
. . . ... ... ...
λL,1 λL,2 λL,3 ...
. . . ... ... λL,K






θ1,l =1 ,2; j =1 ,...,L; j 6= l.
In particular
COV(g1,g  )=λ 1σ2
θ1
COV(g2,g  )=λ 1λ21σ2
θ1.




Hence, from COV(g1,g  )=λ21σ2
θ1, we obtain σ2




θ2,l =3 ,4; j ≥ 3; j 6= l.
Since we know the ﬁrst term on the right hand side by the previous argument, we can proceed using COV(gl,g j)−λl1λj1σ2
θ1
and identify the λj2,j =1 ,...,L using the previous line of reasoning (some of these elements are ﬁxed to zero). Proceeding
in this fashion, we can identify Λ and Σθ subject to diagonal normalizations. This argument works for all but the system
for the Kth and ﬁnal factor. Observe that for all of the preceding factors there are at least three measurements that depend
on θj,j =1 ,K− 1, although only two of the measurements need to depend solely on θ1,...,θj. ( T h i sa r g u m e n ti so b v i o u s
when K =1 .) To obtain the necessary three measurements for the Kth and ﬁnal factor, we require that there be at least
three outcomes with measurements that depend on θ1,...,θK. Knowing Λ and Σθ,w ec a ni d e n t i f yDε. Use of dedicated
11measurement systems for speciﬁc factors and panel data helps to eliminate much of the arbitrariness that plagued factor
analysis in its 1970’s introduction in economics. While many other restrictions on the model are possible, the one we adopt
has the advantage of simplicity and interpretability in many contexts.20
Our analysis uses a version of (19), coupled with the exclusion restrictions exempliﬁed in (21), to identify the joint
distributions of counterfactuals. We extend conventional factor analysis in three ways. First, following Heckman (1981)
and Muthen (1984), we allow the G to include latent index functions like I (associated with the choice equations) or like
Y ∗
s,a as well as their manifestations. Thus the G may include discrete or censored random variables generated by latent
random variables. We can identify components associated solely with the discrete case only up to unknown scale factors
— the familiar indeterminacy in discrete choice analysis. Choice indices, measurements and state contingent outcomes are
all informative on θ. The factor analysis in this paper is conducted on the latent continuous variables that generate the
manifest outcomes. Second, we extend factor analysis to a case with counterfactuals where certain variables are only observed
if state s is observed. This extension enables us to identify the full joint distribution of counterfactuals. Third, we prove
nonparametric identiﬁcation of the distributions of θ and ε, and do not rely on any normality assumptions.
5I d e n t i ﬁcation of Semiparametric Factor Models with Discrete Choices and
Discrete and Continuous Outcomes
In order to establish identiﬁcation, we need to be clear about the raw data with which we are working. For each set of
s-contingent potential outcomes, there is a system like (19): Gs =( M,Ys,D s) where Ys is a vector of state contingent
outcomes. Outcome variables in Gs are of two types: (a) continuous variables and (b) discrete or censored random variables,
including binary strings associated with durations (e.g., unemployment).
Let Mc denote the continuous measurements, and let Y c
s be the continuous counterfactual outcomes. Let Md be the
discrete components of M, while Y d
s are the discrete components of Ys.T a b l e1d e ﬁnes the variables used in our analysis.


















s are assumed to be continuous.21 The indicator variable is generated by latent variable I as deﬁned in (17).22
The data used for the factor analysis are Mc, M∗d, Y c
s , Y ∗d
s and I. For simplicity, in this paper assume that the “discrete”
variables are in fact binary valued. Extensions to censored random variables and to binary strings are straightforward and
12are developed in a later paper. We observe Gs when Ds =1 .F o re a c hs, we have a system of outcome variables. While the
outcomes are s-dependent, the measurements are observed independently of the value assumed by Ds.
The distinction between measurements (M) whose sampled values do not depend on the value assumed by Ds,a n dt h e
state contingent outcomes Ys depend on the state s that is observed, is essential. There is no selection bias in observing M




M, Y, and Ds,s=1 ,..,S all contain information on θ. The information from M is easier to access, and traditional factor
analysis is based on such measurements. Nonetheless, the identiﬁcation of the counterfactual states does not require M.I f
M is available, however, the interpretation of θ is more transparent.
Before turning to our factor analysis, we ﬁrst establish conditions under which we can identify the joint distribution of
Mc,M∗d,Yc
s ,Y∗d
s ,I,which constitute the data for the factor analysis. To understand the basic ideas, we break this task into
three parts: (a) identiﬁcation of the joint distribution of
¡
Mc,M∗d¢
;( b )i d e n t i ﬁcation of the parameters in choice system (17)













s, εW have distribution functions that are absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure with

















s,ε W, respectively, which may be bounded or inﬁnite. The cumulative distribution function of εW is
assumed to be strictly increasing over its full support (εW,εW).T h u st h ej o i n ts y s t e mi sm e a s u r a b l ys e p a r a b l e( v a r i a t i o n
free).23 We assume ﬁnite variances.24




s), where Q is a vector of state-speciﬁc regressors Q=(Q1,...,Q S).
We denote by “~” normalized values where the normalizations in our context are usually standard deviations of latent
index errors. We ﬁrst consider identiﬁcation of the joint distribution of M. Our results are contained in Theorem 1.






, (the latter component only up
to scale) the function µd
m (X) is identiﬁed and µc
m (X) is identiﬁed over the support of X ( u pt os c a l e )p r o v i d e dt h a tt h e
following assumptions, in addition to the relevant components of (A-1) and (A-2), are invoked.
(A-3) Order the discrete measurement components to be ﬁrst. Suppose that there are Nm,d discrete components, followed by



















is measurably separable (variation free) in all of its
coordinates when “⊇” is replaced by “= .”




(A-5) The X lives in a subset of RNX. T h e r ee x i s t sn ol i n e a rp r o p e rs u b s p a c eo f RNX having probability 1 under FX, the
distribution function of X.
13Proof: See Appendix A.
Condition (A-4) is conventional (See Cosslett, 1983, or Manski, 1988). Weaker conditions are available using the analysis of
Matzkin (1992,1993). Support condition (A-3) appears in Cameron and Heckman (1998) and Aakvik, Heckman and Vytlacil
(1999). The easiest way to satisfy it is to have exclusions: one continuous component in µd
l,m(X) that is not an argument in
the others. But that is only a suﬃcient condition. Even without exclusion, this condition can be satisﬁed if there are enough
continuous regressors in X and the µd
l,m(X) have a full rank Jacobian - with respect to the derivatives of the continuous (X)
variables. Intuitively, if the rank condition is satisﬁed, we can hold µd
l,m(X) at ¯ µd
l,m and vary the other arguments. Formally,




l,m, into a Nm,d







≥ Nm,d.T h i sr e q u i r e sNm,d
continuous variables. It also requires that the coeﬃcients are linearly independent. If the number of continuous components
is NX <N m,d, we can only identify NX components of the distribution of Ud
m. We can trace out the distribution of the
latent variables even if the X are not of full rank, so (A-5) is not strictly required. Observe that we can identify the joint
distribution of the Um even if all components of β are not identiﬁed because of a failure of a rank condition. See Cameron
and Heckman (1998), Aakvik, Heckman and Vytlacil (1999) or Hansen, Heckman and Mullen (2003) for more discussion of
this case of identiﬁcation without conventional exclusion restrictions.
We next turn to identiﬁcation of the generalized ordered discrete choice model (17). This extends the proof in Cameron
and Heckman (1998) by parameterizing the cut points. A more general version of this paper appears in Hansen, Heckman
and Mullen (2001).
Theorem 2 For the relevant subsets of the conditions (A-1), and (A-2) (speciﬁcally, assuming absolute continuity of the
distribution of εW with respect to Lebesgue measure and εW ⊥ ⊥ (Z,Q)), and the additional assumptions:
(A-6) cs(Qs)=Qsηs,s=1 ,...,S,ϕ(Z)=Z0β
(A-7) (Q1,Z) is full rank (there is no proper subspace of the support (Q1,Z) with probability 1. The Z contains no intercept.).
(A-8) (Qs,Q s−1,Z) are measurably separable (variation free) over their domains of deﬁnition for each s =2 ,...,¯ S. The Q
contain no constants.
(A-9) Support (c(Q1) − ϕ(Z)) ⊇ Support (εW)
Then the distribution function FεW i sk n o w nu pt oas c a l en o r m a l i z a t i o no nεW and cs(Qs),s=1 ,...¯ s, and ϕ(Z) are
identiﬁed up to a scale normalization.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Our choice system can be made nonparametric using the type of restrictions introduced in Matzkin, although we eschew
that generality here. Matzkin and Lewbel (2002) weaken (A-6) generalizing the analysis of Matzkin (1992) assuming that
the cs are constants.
We next turn to the identiﬁcation of the joint system (Mc,M∗d,Yc
s ,Y∗d
s ,I). The data for each choice system (including
14the data on choice probabilities) generate the left hand side
(22) Pr
¡
Mc ≤ mc,M∗d ≥ 0,Yc
s ≤ yc
s,Y∗d
s ≥ 0|Ds =1 ,X,Z,Q s,Q s−1
¢



































From Theorem 1 we know µc
m(X)( =Xβ
c











σW ,s=1 ,...,S and the coeﬃcients ηs,β and the distribution Fe εW. Notice that cs(Qs) ≥


















s × e EW).
(A-11) T h e r ei sn op r o p e rl i n e a rs u b s p a c eo f (X,Z,Qs,Q s−1) with probability one so the model is full rank.
As a consequence of (A-6) and (A-10) we can ﬁnd values of Qs,Q s−1, ¯ Qs,Q





Pr(Ds=1 |Z,Qs,Q s−1)=1 .
In these limit sets (which may depend on Z), under the stated conditions (A-1) — (A-11), we can identify the joint
distribution of (Mc,M∗d,Yc
s ,Y∗d
s ),s=1 ,...,S using an argument parallel to the one used to prove Theorem 1. These limit
sets produce S diﬀerent joint distributions (corresponding to each value of s) but do not generate joint distributions accross
the s (i.e. the joint distribution of Mc,M∗d,Yc
s ,Y∗d
s accross s values). However, M is common accross these systems. Using
the dependence of M and Ys,s=1 ,...,S on a common θ we can sometimes identify the joint distribution. See Carneiro,
Hansen and Heckman (2001) for an example. Thus with a measurement system M we do not strictly require information on
t h ec h o i c ei n d e xI to identify the model.
Following an argument of Heckman (1990), Heckman and Honoré (1990) and Heckman and Smith (1998), we can identify
µc
s(X) up to an additive constant without passing to the limit set where Pr(Ds =1 |Z,Qs,Q s−1)=1 . This is not possible
for the identiﬁcation of ˜ µ
d
s(X) because there is no counterpart to the variation in yc
s for the discrete component. This is the
content of the following theorem which combines the key ideas of Theorems 1 and 2 to produce an identiﬁcation theorem for
the general case.












Proof: See Appendix A.
As noted in the discussion following Theorem 1, without standard exclusion restrictions we may only be able to identify




s,l m a yo n l yb ed e ﬁned over their supports. Under an additional rank or variation-free condition on the regressors we
recover these functions everywhere over the support of X.
155.1 Factor Analysis







. We factor analyze them under assumptions like those invoked in matrix (21) with two or more of these
elements dependent solely on θ1, an additional two or more elements dependent solely on (θ1,θ 2) and so forth but at least
three ﬁnal elements dependent on θK.T h e r ea r eat o t a lo fA×R outcomes in each state where R is the number of outcome
measures in each state at each age (e.g., wages, employment, occupation), there are M non-state-contingent measurements
and ˜ εW is a scalar. Thus L in (21) is A × R + M +1in dimension for each system s,s =1 ,...,S.
We write the unobservables in factor structure form
Us,a = α0
s,aθ + εs,a with s =1 ,...,Sa =1 ,...,A
Um = α0
mθ + εm with m =1 ,...,Nm
εW = γ0θ + εI.
The αs,a may be diﬀerent across s-states so that each s system may depend on diﬀerent θ.T h e αm are not, nor is the
γ. There may be multiple measurements of outcomes so in principle αs,a may be a matrix and εs,a a vector of mutually
independent components. Our empirical analysis is for the vector case.
The choice of how to select the blocks of (21) may appear to be arbitrary, but in many applications there are natural
orderings. Thus in the empirical work reported below we estimate a two factor model. We have a vector of ﬁve test scores
that proxy latent ability (θ1). The state contingent outcomes (earnings) equations and choice equations plausibly depend on
both θ1 and θ2. In many applications there are often natural allocations of factors to various measurements. However, to
avoid arbitrariness a carefully reasoned defense of any allocation is required. We now formalize identiﬁcation in this system.
Theorem 4 Under the normalizations on the factor loadings of the type in (21) for one system s under the conditions
of Theorems 1-3, given the normalizations for the unobservables for the discrete components and given at least 2K +1
measurements (Y,M,I), the unrestricted factor loadings and the variances of the factors (σ2
θi,i=1 ,...,K) are identiﬁed for
all systems.
Proof: The proof is implicit in the discussion surrounding equation (21). ¥
Observe that since the σ2
θi,i=1 ,...,K are identiﬁed in one system, normalizations of speciﬁc factor loadings to unity only
need to be made in that system since we can apply knowledge of these variances to the other systems.25 Thus for the other
systems (values of the state other than s) we do not need to normalize any factor loading to unity.
We can also nonparametrically identify the densities of the uniquenesses and the factors. This follows from mutual
independence of the θi,i=1 ,...,K and an application of Kotlarski’s Theorem (1967). We ﬁrst state Kotlarski’s Theorem
a n dt h e nw ea p p l yi tt oo u rp r o b l e m .
Write ({Um}M
m=1,{Us,a}A
a=1,ε W) in vector form as Ts. Order the vectors so that the ﬁrst B1 elements depend only on θ1,
the next B2 − B1 elements depend on (θ1,θ2) and so forth. Let Ts
1 and T s
2 be the ﬁrst two elements of Ts. (This is purely
a notational convenience). We order the elements of Ts so that the ﬁrst block depends solely on θ1, (assume that there are
16B1 such measurements) the second block depends solely on on θ1,θ2 (there are B2 − B1 such measurements) and so forth,
following the convention established in equation (21). We require B1 ≥ 2,B 2 − B1 ≥ 2, and BK − BK−1 ≥ 3.
Theorem 5 If
Ts
1 = θ1 + v1
and
Ts
2 = θ1 + v2
and θ1 ⊥ ⊥v1 ⊥ ⊥v2,the means of all three generating random variables are ﬁnite, and the conditions of Fubini’s theorem are
satisﬁed for each random variable, and the random variables possess nonvanishing (a.e.) characteristic functions, then the
densities of (θ1,v 1,v 2),g(θ1),g 1(v1),g 2(v2), respectively, are identiﬁed.
Proof: Kotlarski (1967). See also Rao (1992). ¥
Applied to our context, consider the ﬁrst two equations of T and suppose that the components depend only on θ1.W e















Here we use a notation associating the subscript of εi with its position in the T s vector. Applying Theorem 4, we can identify
λ
s
21 (subject to the normalization λ
s
11 =1 ) . Thus we can rewrite these equations as
Ts



















S i n c ew ek n o wλ21 we can identify g(εs
2).L e tB1 denote the number of measurements (elements of Ts) which depend only
on θ1.Proceeding through the ﬁrst B1 measurements, we can identify g(εs
i), i =1 ,...,B1.
Proceeding to equations B1+1and B1+2(corresponding to the ﬁrst two measurements in the next set of equations that



































B1+2,2,a n dt h eεs
B1+1 and ε
∗,s
B1+2 are mutually independent. Hence by Theorem 5, we can identify densities
g(θ2),g(εs
B1+1),g(εs
B1+2). Exploiting the structure (21), we can proceed sequentially to identify the densities of θ, g(θi),i=
1,...,K and the uniqueness, g(εs
i) for all the components of vector Ts. For the components of εs
i corresponding to discrete
measurements, we do not identify the scale. Armed with knowledge of the densities of the θi and the factor loadings for
other values of s, we can apply standard deconvolution methods to nonparametrically identify the uniqueness of the εi’s for
the other systems. Thus we can nonparametrically identify the error terms for the model. Notice that in principle we can
estimate separate distributions of the θi for each s system and thus can test the hypothesis of equality of these distributions
across systems.
The essential idea in this paper is to obtain identiﬁcation of the joint counterfactual distribution through the dependence
across s of Ys =( Y d
s ,Yc
s ) on the common factors that also generate M or I. In this sense measurements and choices are
both sources of identifying information, and can be traded oﬀ in terms of identiﬁcation. We next apply our framework to a
well-posed economic model.
6 Generalizing The Willis-Rosen Model
We revisit Willis and Rosen’s application of the Roy model (1979) to the economics of education, adding uncertainty,
nonpecuniary net returns to schooling and identifying counterfactual distributions of gross and net returns. In this paper the
outcomes are utility outcomes, present value outcomes and rates of return.
Suppose that agents cannot lend or borrow and possess log preferences (utility =l nC,w h e r eC is consumption). Suppose








where P is the “cost” of going to school, expressed as a percentage of utility. These include tuition costs and the psychic
beneﬁts from working in sector 1 (relative to sector 0). Thus costs may be negative. ρ is a subjective time preference rate.









a and Y 0
a are earnings from high school and college, respectively, at age a. The psychic costs or beneﬁts in logs for
high school are normalized to zero. We can only identify relative psychic “costs” or beneﬁts.














In addition we have measurements on test scores M = µM(x)+α0












The agent makes decisions about schooling under uncertainty about diﬀerent components of the model. Iθ is the infor-
mation set. The expected value V of going to college is :





























,a=0 ,..,A are not known at the time schooling decisions are made but innova-
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EIθ (θ) − εP.
















a (X) − µ0
a (X)
(1 + ρ)





















σP > 0 ; Ds =0otherwise.
Specifying alternative information sets (Iθ) and examining the resulting ﬁt of the model to data, we can determine which
information sets agents act on. Exact econometric speciﬁcations are presented in Section 7. We test whether agents act
on components of θ that also appear in outcome equations realized after the choices are made. The estimated dependence
between schooling choices and subsequent realizations of earnings enables us to identify the components in the agent’s
information set at the time schooling decisions are being made. This extends the method of Flavin (1981) and Hansen,
Roberds and Sargent (1991) to a discrete choice setting. If agents do not act on these components, then those components
are intrinsically uncertain at the time agents make their schooling decisions unless nongeneric cancellations occur.26 Because
we can identify the joint distributions of unobservables, we can answer questions Willis and Rosen could not such as: (1)
How highly correlated are latent skills (utilities) across sectoral choices? (2) How much intrinsic uncertainty do agents face?
(3) How important is uncertainty for explaining schooling choices? (4) What fraction of the population regrets its ex ante
schooling choice ex post? We can also separate out net psychic components of the returns to schooling (the lnP)f r o m
monetary components.
Observe that as a consequence of the log speciﬁcation of preferences (including the additive separability of the θ and ε),
mean preserving spreads in εj
a,θ and εP produce no change in mean utility. The probability of selection Ds =1is also
19invariant to mean preserving spreads in εj
a but not for θ and εP since their variance enters the choice probability if these
components are known to the agent.
In addition, a mean preserving spread in lnY is not the same as a mean preserving spread in Y . Mean preserving spreads








. A mean preserving spread keeps the mean of Y ﬁxed at constant k = E (Y )=eµE (eε).








E(eε) d∆.M o r e o v e r , b e c a u s e E (ε)=0and εeε is convex increasing in ε, the derivative
















2 so an increase in the variance is equivalent to a decrease in the mean utility. We consider the eﬀects of
mean preserving spreads on both mean log utility and on the probability that V is positive (college is selected). We now
turn to the empirical analysis of this paper.
7 Empirical Results
We use the NLSY data for white males described in Appendix B (posted at http://lily.src.uchicago.edu/CHH_estimating.html;
from now on “the website”) and augmented with the PSID data to estimate the Willis-Rosen Model. Main features of the
data are presented in Table 2. We focus on two schooling decisions; graduating from a four year college or graduating from
high school. We thus abstract from the full multiplicity of choices of schooling. This is clearly a bold simpliﬁcation but it
allows us to focus on the main points of this paper.
As a measurement system (M) for cognitive ability we use ﬁve components of the ASVAB test battery (arithmetic
reasoning, word knowledge, paragraph composition, math knowledge and coding speed). We dedicate the ﬁrst factor (θ1)t o
the ability measurement system and exclude the other factors from that system (recall the normalizations in equation (21)).
We include family background variables as additional covariates in the ASVAB test equations (the µM(X)).
To simplify the empirical analysis, we divide the lifetimes of individuals into two periods. The ﬁrst period covers ages 19
to 29, and the second covers ages 30 to 65. We compute annual earnings by multiplying the hourly wage by hours worked
each year for each individual. We impute missing wages and project earnings for the ages not observed in the NLSY data
using the procedure described in Appendix B. The NLSY data do not contain information on the full life cycle of earnings.
We project the missing NLSY earnings using estimates of lifetime earnings from the PSID data.
Tables 2a-b present the sample statistics. They show that while college graduates have higher earnings than high school
graduates, all of the gain to attending college comes after age 30. College graduates also have much higher test scores and
come from better family backgrounds than high school graduates. They are more likely to live in locations where a college
is present and where college tuition is lower.
In the notation of Section 5, ¯ S =2(two choices), ¯ R =1(there is one outcome per person, earnings), ¯ M =5(there are ﬁve
test scores that are generated solely by θ1)a n d ¯ A =2(there are two periods in the life cycle). In addition, there is utility index
I. The test scores depend solely on θ1. The outcomes and index are allowed to depend on (θ1,θ 2).A s s u m i n gn o n - z e r of a c t o r
loadings, we satisfy the conditions for identiﬁcation presented in Theorem 4. Recall that K =2 .W eh a v eﬁve measurements
20generated solely by θ1. There are three measurements generated by θ1 and θ2 for each schooling level. (Outcomes and choices
are deﬁned for each choice system). Exclusion restrictions are given in Table 2c along with speciﬁcation of the equations.
Tuition and family background identify the parameters of the schooling equations. Local labor market variables identify the
parameters of utility equations. Assuming that test scores are continuous outcomes, no exclusions are needed for identiﬁcation
of the test score equations.
In this section, to facilitate exposition we denote the college state (choice 1) by c, while high school (choice 0) is denoted
by h. We model log earnings (utility of earnings) at each age as:




where Ya,s is earnings in period (age) a if the schooling level is s, X is a vector of covariates, θ is a vector of factors (two
factors, in our application) η1,s and η2,s are calculated by the procedure described in Appendix B (available on the website).
We compute the present value of log earnings (lifetime utility) in the ﬁrst period (ages 19 to 29) and in the second period
(ages 30 to 65). Let V1,s be the period 1 gross utility of achieving schooling level s, and V2,s be the period 2 gross utility of
obtaining schooling level s. Using (23), we write the gross utilities as
V1,s = ¯ δ1,s + X0¯ β1,s + ¯ α0
1,sθ +¯ ε1,s
V2,s = ¯ δ2,s + X0¯ β2,s + ¯ α0
2,sθ +¯ ε2,s.










δa,s + X0βa,s + α0




























































and terms for the second period of data (30-65) are deﬁned analogously. The “cost” or psychic net return of going to college
is written as:
lnP = δP + Z0γ + α0
Pθ + εP.
These “costs” can be negative as they entail both psychic and tuition components. The criterion for the choice of schooling
is:
V = E (V1,c + V2,c − V1,h − V2,h|X,θ) − E(lnP|Z,X,θ,εP)
= ¯ δ1,c + X0¯ β1,c + ¯ α0
1,cθ + ¯ δ2,c + X0¯ β2,c + ¯ α0
2,cθ − ¯ δ1,h − X0¯ β1,h − ¯ α0
1,hθ − ¯ δ2,h − X0¯ β2,h − ¯ α0
2,hθ −
−δP − Z0γ − α0
Pθ − εP
=
¡¯ δ1,c + ¯ δ2,c − ¯ δ1,h − ¯ δ2,h − δP
¢






1,c + ¯ α0
2,c − ¯ α0





Individuals go to college if V> 0. We test (and do not reject) the hypothesis that at the time they make their college
decision agents know their cost function and both factors θ, but not the uniquenesses in the outcome equations. The test
score equations have a similar structure. Let Tj be test score j:
Tj = X0ωj + α0
testjθ + εtestj
where X is the vector of covariates in the test score equation, and ωj is the covariate vector. The distributions of the θ and ε
are nonparametrically identiﬁed under the assumptions supporting Theorems 1-5. In this paper, we assume that each factor









22Mixtures of normals with a large enough number of components approximate any distribution of θk and the ε arbitrarily
well (Ferguson, 1983). We assume that the ε’s are normal although in principle they are nonparametrically identiﬁed from
the analysis of Theorem 5.
We estimate the model using Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods as described in Appendix C (available on the website)
for 55,000 iterations, discarding the ﬁrst 5,000 iterations to allow the chain to converge to its stationary distribution. We
retain every 10th of the remaining 50,000 iterations for a total of 5,000 iterations.27 The Markov Chain mixes well with most
autocorrelations dying out at around lag 25 to 50.
We estimate models with one factor and with two factors. The estimated coeﬃcients are presented as Tables A1 through
A5 in the supplementary tables on the website. The two factor model speciﬁes that the ﬁrst factor only appears in test scores
and choice equations while the second factor appears in all equations. No additional factors are necessary to ﬁt this data.





are not in the agent’s
information set at the time schooling decisions are made. If they were, they would be an additional source of covariance (i.e.,
additional factors) between choice and future earnings. If we use only one factor that enters in all equations, the quality of
the ﬁt is poorer (results available on request). From this testing procedure we infer that agents know both components of
θ at the time they enroll in college. Figure 1 shows the ﬁt of the density of the present value of log earnings (or lifetime
utility of earnings excluding psychic costs and beneﬁts) for everyone in the population. It graphs the actual and predicted
densities of gross utility. The ﬁt is very good. Results for each schooling group are available on request and are equally good
(χ2 goodness of ﬁt tests are passed overall as well as for the distribution of utility for each schooling group; see Table A6).
In order to achieve this good ﬁt it is necessary to allow for non-normal factors. Figure 2 shows the distribution of each of the
estimated two factors and compares each of them with a benchmark normal with the same mean and standard deviation.
Neither factor is normal.28 There is clear evidence of selection on ability (factor 1), with the less able less likely to attend
college. There is weaker evidence of selection on factor 2.
Table 3a-b presents the factor loadings in the outcome, choice and measurement equations.29 Both factors have a positive
eﬀect on gross utility for both schooling levels in each period and on schooling attainment (the I). Factor 1 explains most
of the variance in the test score system (see Table 3b) while factor 2 explains most of the variance in the utility system (see
Table 3a). The returns to college in terms of gross utility (gross utility diﬀerences) are given by:
V1,c + V2,c − V1,h − V2,h =
¡¯ δ1,c + ¯ δ2,c − ¯ δ1,h − ¯ δ2,h
¢






1,c + ¯ α0
2,c − ¯ α0
1,h − ¯ α0
2,h
¢
θ +( ¯ ε1,c +¯ ε2,c −¯ ε1,h −¯ ε2,h).
Both factors increase returns. While the second factor explains much more of the variance in utility than the ﬁrst factor
does, the ﬁrst factor explains more of the variance in returns than the second factor. However, it explains only 30% of the
variance in returns. We infer that agents know θ (the factors) based on the superior ﬁt of a model that includes nonzero
factor loadings on both factors in the choice equation but not the innovations in outcomes (the ε’s in the outcome equations)
at the time they make their schooling decision. Our results indicate that the unpredictability in gross utility gains (i.e.
diﬀerences) of going to college is much larger than the unpredictability in utility levels. Both factors have a negative impact
on “costs” (the factor loadings are positive in the “cost” function). Therefore, both factors positively inﬂuence the likelihood
23of going to college since both contribute positively to returns and negatively to costs.
Figure 5 plots the estimated factual and counterfactual gross college utility densities for college graduates and high school
graduates, respectively (see Figure A3 on the website for the corresponding ﬁgure for high school utility). College graduates
have the highest level of gross utility both as high school graduates and as college graduates. They also have the highest
gains of going to college as demonstrated in Figure 430 (we can also compute gross utility gains as a percentage of the gross





see Figure A4 on the website). Figure 5 presents the marginal treatment eﬀect as deﬁned in equation (6) using utils as the
outcome. This is the gross gain in utils of going to college as a function of εW, which is an index of variables that increase the
likelihood of enrollment in college. It shows that individuals who are likely to enroll in college have higher returns to college
than those who are unlikely to enroll in college who have lower values of εW. Figure 5 also shows the distribution of εW in the
populations. Most of the mass of this distribution is at values of εW around 0. Many individuals have negative gross utility
returns (excluding psychic beneﬁts of going to college). Even among those deciding to go to college, 39.53% would have
higher utility (ignoring psychic components) had they not gone to college. There is a deﬁnite fall oﬀ in utility gains as college
enrollment is expanded to the less college prone. Table 4 shows that college graduates have higher potential high school and
college utility than high school graduates in high school and in college (these are gross utilities). Table 5 shows that the gross
returns of going to college are higher for those who choose to go to college (these results are expected given the pattern on
Figures 4-5). The returns for attending college for the average high school graduate are negative. The returns to college for
the individual at the margin (V =0 ) are about 0.59% of total high school utility. Since these individuals are exactly at the
margin, these gains have to correspond exactly to the cost they are facing. Once we account for the nonmonetary costs and
beneﬁts of going to college (net returns in the bottom two rows of Table 5) the relative returns of going to college become
more negative for high school graduates and more positive for college graduates. Since lnP can be allocated as either a cost
or a return, there are two ways to compute returns depending on whether lnP is treated as a cost (row 2) or a return (row
3). These bound the true returns. We present two sets of net return estimates depending on how “costs” or “gains” (lnP)
are allocated. The second row treats lnP as cost. The third counts it as a psychic beneﬁt. These are bounds since the actual
allocation between cost and beneﬁt is indeterminate.
The patterns of Figures 3-5 are essentially the same as the patterns revealed for present value of earnings in Figures 6-8.
Table 6 shows that college graduates have earnings 57% higher than they would have had (or $608,372 higher, on average)
if they did not go to college. High school graduates have a gross gain of 43% (or $362,987) if they go to college. Notice that
even though the utility gains of going to college are negative for high school graduates, the money returns are positive and
large. Table 7 shows that even though 39.66% of the persons going to college would have had a higher utility in high school
than in college (ignoring psychic gains), only 6.9% of this population had higher earnings in high school than in college. Once
we account for psychic beneﬁts, the proportion of college students regretting their decisions is roughly the same whether we
m e a s u r er e g r e ti np r e s e n tv a l u eo ru t i l s .T h i ss h o w st h ei m p o r t a nce of accounting for psychic returns in analyzing schooling
choices. Among high school graduates, 95.90% do not regret not going to college (measured in utils), but 85.26% regret
the decision ﬁnancially. The marginal treatment eﬀect has the same general shape when present values of earnings are used
24instead of gross utility (see Figure 8).
Table 8 shows the probability of being in decile i of the college potential discounted earnings distribution conditional on
being in decile j of the high school potential earnings distribution. (These are gross earnings.) It shows that neither an
independence assumption across outcomes, which is the Veil of Ignorance Assumption used in applied welfare theory, (see,
e.g., Sen (1973)) or in aggregate income inequality decompositions (DiNardo, Lemieux and Fortin, 1996) nor a perfect ranking
assumption, which are sometimes used to construct counterfactual joint distributions of outcomes, (see e.g. Heckman, Smith,
and Clements, 1997 or Athey and Imbens, 2002) are satisﬁed in the data. There is a strong positive dependence between
potential outcomes in each counterfactual state, but it is not perfect dependence (there are substantial nonzero elements
outside the diagonal). We get similar results for utils (discounted log earnings—see our website).
We have already shown that there is a large dispersion in the distribution of utilities, utility returns, earnings, and earnings
returns to college. However, this dispersion can be due to heterogeneity that is known at the time the agent makes schooling
decisions, or it can be due to heterogeneity that is not predictable by the agent at that time. Figure 9 plots the densities
of the unforecastable component of college gross utilities at the time college decisions are made for ﬁxed X values, under
three diﬀerent information sets. (The X are ﬁxed at their means.) The solid line corresponds to the case where the agent
does not know his factor (θ) nor his innovations (ε’s in the outcome equations). The other two lines correspond respectively
to the cases where the agent knows θ2 only, or both θ1 and θ2.31 Knowledge of θ2 dramatically decreases the uncertainty
faced, but knowledge of factor 1 (associated with cognitive ability) has only a small eﬀect on the amount of uncertainty
faced by the agent. We obtain a similar ﬁgure in terms of gross utility in high school.32 However, even though knowledge
of θ2 reduces dramatically the amount of uncertainty faced in terms of levels of gross utility in each counterfactual state,
it has only a small eﬀect on the uncertainty faced in terms of returns (see Figure 10). Table 9 reports the variances of
gross and net utility and gross and net present value of earnings under diﬀerent information sets of agents. Giving agents
more information (factors) reduces the variance in utilities or present values. However, reducing uncertainty barely budges
the forecast returns to schooling measured in dollars or utils—the message of Figure 10. Analogous results are obtained for
present value of earnings. See the website.
The fact that a two factor model is adequate to ﬁt the data implies that the agents cannot forecast future shocks of log
earnings (¯ ε1,c,¯ ε2,c,¯ ε1,h,¯ ε2,h) at the time they make their schooling decision. (If they did, they would enter as additional
factors in the estimated model.) Even though the factors (θ) explain most of the variance in levels of utilities, they explain
less than half of the variance in returns, which may lead one to conclude that the reason so many college graduates would
have higher gross utility in high school than in college (39%) is because they cannot accurately forecast their returns of going
to college. However this is not the case. As shown in Table 7 once we account for psychic beneﬁts or costs of attending college
(P) relative to attending high school, only 8% of college graduates regret going to college. This suggests a substantial part
of the gain to college is due to non-pecuniary components. Furthermore, Table 10 shows that if individuals had knowledge of
(¯ ε1,c,¯ ε2,c,¯ ε1,h,¯ ε2,h), keeping their average expected earnings the same, very few of them would change their schooling decision.
Uncertainty in gains is substantial but knowledge of this uncertainty has a very small eﬀect on the choice of schooling because
the variance of gains is so much smaller than the variance of psychic costs or beneﬁts, and it is the latter that drives most of
the heterogeneity in schooling decisions. When conducting this experiment, we make sure that the average expected earnings
25are the same because a mean preserving reduction in the uncertainty faced by the agents in terms of utility is not the same
as a mean preserving change in uncertainty in terms of levels of earnings (see Appendix D on the website).33 In particular a
change in the variance of (¯ ε1,c,¯ ε2,c,¯ ε1,h,¯ ε2,h) would not change the expected utility in each schooling level but would certainly
change expected earnings in each schooling level. The numbers reported in Table 10 take this into account. When agents
know their (¯ ε1,c,¯ ε2,c,¯ ε1,h,¯ ε2,h), they face less uncertainty. Knowing these components is equivalent to setting ∆ =0in the
expression at the end of Section 6. The expected utility at each schooling level increases.34
8 Some Evidence on an Educational Reform
Using the estimated model, we evaluate the eﬀect of a full subsidy to college tuition. We move beyond the Veil of Ignorance
which is based on an anonymity assumption and evaluates reforms considering only its overall impacts on inequality, to
consider which individuals are beneﬁtted by the reform. We consider only partial equilibrium treatment eﬀects and do not
consider the full cost of ﬁnancing the reforms. Table 4 shows the average lifetime gross utility of participants before the
policy change and Table 5 shows their pre-policy average return to college. These tables compare these levels and returns
with what the marginal participant attracted into schooling by the policy would earn. The marginal person has lower utility
in college and lower returns to college than the average person in college. Since the policy aﬀects the schooling decisions of
the individuals at the margin, there will be a decline in the quality of college graduates after the policy is implemented, since
the new entrants are of lower average quality than the incumbents.
Despite the substantial size of the policy changes we consider, the induced eﬀects on participation are small. The full
tuition subsidy only increases graduation from four-year college by 4%.35 The policies operate unevenly over the deciles
of the initial outcome distribution. Figure 11 shows the proportion of high school people in each decile of the high school
present value of earnings distribution induced to graduate from four-year college by the tuition subsidy. The ﬁgure shows
that providing a free college education mostly aﬀects people at the top end of the high school earnings distribution (the same
result holds when we consider distributions of utilities instead of distributions of lifetime earnings). The policy does not
beneﬁt the poor. A calculation based on the Veil of Ignorance using the Gini coeﬃcient would show no eﬀect of the policy
up to two decimal points. Our analysis relaxes the Veil of Ignorance, and lets us study the impact of policies on persons at
diﬀerent positions of the income distribution. It goes beyond the counterfactual simulations used in the inequality literature
(see e.g. DiNardo, Lemieux and Fortin, 1996) to account for self selection into sectors in response to policy changes.
9 Summary and Conclusions
This paper uses low dimensional factor models to generate counterfactual distributions of potential outcomes. It extends
matching by allowing some of the variables that determine conditional independence to be unobserved by the analyst.
Semiparametric identiﬁcation is established.
We apply our methods to a problem in the economics of education. We extend the Willis-Rosen model to explicitly
account for dependence in potential outcomes across potential schooling states, to account for psychic beneﬁts in the return
to schooling and to measure the eﬀect of uncertainty on schooling choices. We extend the framework of Flavin (1981) and
26Hansen, Roberds and Sargent (1991), who estimate the impact of uncertainty on consumption choices to a discrete choice
setting. Our framework extends the inequality decomposition analysis of DiNardo, Lemieux and Fortin (1996) to account for
self selection in the choice of sectors.
Our analysis reveals substantial heterogeneity in the returns to schooling, much of which is unpredictable at the time
schooling decisions are made. We also ﬁnd a substantial non-pecuniary return to college. Although there is substantial
uncertainty in forecasting returns at the time schooling decisions are made, eliminating it has modest eﬀects on schooling
choices. Nonpecuniary factors play a dominant role in schooling choices. The assumption of perfect ranking of potential
outcome across alternative choices is soundly rejected, although potential outcomes are strongly positively correlated.
W es i m u l a t eat u i t i o nr e d u c t i o np o l i c yt od e t e r m i n ew h ob e n e ﬁts and loses from it. We go beyond the Veil of Ignorance
to see which persons are aﬀected by the policy. The policy favors those at the top of the income distribution. This simulation
illustrates the power of our method to lift the Veil of Ignorance, and to count the losers and gainers from any policy initiative.
27Appendix A : Proofs of Theorems
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 :T h ec a s ew h e r eM consists of purely continuous components is trivial. We observe Mc for each X
and can recover the marginal distribution for each component. Recall that M is not state dependent.
For the purely discrete case, we encounter the usual problem that there is no direct observable counterpart for µd
m (X).
Under (A-1)-(A-5), we can use the analysis of Manski (1988) to identify the slope coeﬃcients β
d
l,m up to scale, and the marginal
distribution of Ud
l,m. From the assumption that the mean (or median) of Ud
l,m is zero, we can identify the intercept in β
d
l,m.




m (X) and e µ
d
m (X), the latter up to scale (“~” means identiﬁed up to scale).
To recover the joint distribution write:









by assumption (A-2). To identify FUc
m,e Ud
m (t1,t 2) for any given evaluation points in the support of (Uc
m, e Ud
m), we know the
function e µ
d
m (X) and using (A-3) we can ﬁnd an X where e µ
d
m (X)=t2. Let b x denote this value, so e µ
d
m (b x)=t2.In this proof,
t1,t 2 may be vectors. Thus
Pr(Mc ≤ mc,M d =( 0 ,...,0) | X = b x)=FUc
m,e Ud
m (mc − µc
m (b x),t 2)
Let b mc = t1 − µc
m (b x) to obtain
Pr(Mc ≤ mc,M d =( 0 ,...,0) | X = b x)=FUc
m,e Ud
m (t1,t 2)
We know the left hand side and thus identify FUc
m,e Ud
m at the evaluation point t1,t 2.S i n c e( t1,t 2) is any arbitrary evaluation
point in the support of Uc
m, e Ud
m we can thus identify the full joint distribution.¥36
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 :
Pr(D1 =1| Z,Q1)=P r
µ






Under (A-1), (A-2), (A-5), (A-6) (A-7) (A-8) and (A-9), it follows that
c1(Q1)−ϕ(Z)
σW and F˜ εW (where e εW = εW
σW )a r ei d e n t i ﬁed
(see Manski, 1988 or Matzkin 1992, 1993). Under rank condition (A-7), identiﬁcation of
c1(Q1)−ϕ(Z)
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Thus we can identify
c2(Q2)
σW and, proceeding sequentially, we can identify
cs(Qs)
σW ,s=2 ,..,S.¥ Observe that we could use theﬁnal choice (Pr(s = S)) rather than the initial choice to identify the model using an obvious change in the assumptions.P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3 :From (A-2), the unobservables are jointly independent of (X,Z,Q). For ﬁxed values of (Z,Qs,Q s−1),
we may vary the points of evaluation for the continuous coordinates (yc
s) and pick alternative values of X = b x to trace out
the vector µc(X) up to intercept terms. Thus we can identify µc
s,l(X) up to a constant for all l =1 ,...,Nc,s.(Heckman and
Honoré, 1990). Under (A-2), we recover the same functions for whatever values of Z,Qs,Q s−1 are prespeciﬁed as long as
cs (Qs) >c s−1 (Qs−1), so that there is interval of εW bounded above and below with positive probability. This identiﬁcation
result does not require any passage to a limit argument.





Pr(Ds=1 |Z,Qs,Q s−1)=1 .
where ¯ Qs (Z) is an upper limit and Qs−1 (Z) is a lower limit, and we allow the limits to depend on (X,Z), we essentially
integrate out e εW and obtain





s − µc(X), e Ud
s > −e µ
d
s(X))
We know that this probability can be achieved by virtue of the support condition of assumption (A-10).
Then proceeding as in the proof of Theorem 1, we can identify e µ
d
s(X) coordinate by coordinate and we obtain the
constants in µc
s,l(X),l=1 ,...,Nc,s as well as the constants in e µ
d(X). From the assumption of mean or median zero of the
unobservables. In this exercise, we use the full rank condition on X which is part of assumption (A-11).















s,e εW).¥Appendix B: Description of the Data
We use white males from NLSY79. In the original sample there are 2439 individuals. We consider the information on
these individuals from age 19 to age 35. We discard 663 individuals because they have observations missing for at least one
of the covariate variables we use in the exercise. Table 1 at http://lily.src.uchicago.edu/CHH_estimating.html contains a
description of the number of missing observations per variable. For example, we discard 50 individuals because we do not
observe whether they were living in the South when they were 14 years-old or not. Then we discard another 6 for not having
information on whether they lived in urban area at age 14, other 5 for not reporting the number of siblings, 221 for not
indicating parental education and so on, as described in table 2. We then restrict the NLSY sample to white males with a
high school or college degree. We deﬁne high school graduates as individuals having a high school degree or having completed
12 grades and never reporting college attendance. We deﬁne participation in college as having a college degree or having
complete more than 16 years in school. We exclude the oversample of poor whites. Experience is Mincer experience (age-12
if high-school graduate, age-16 for college graduate). The variables that we include in the outcome and choice equations are
number of siblings, parental years of schooling, AFQT, year of birth dummies, average tuition of the colleges in the county
the individual lives in at 17 (we simulate the policy change by decreasing this variable by $1000 for each individual), distance
to the nearest college at 17, average local blue collar wage in state of residence at 17 (or in 1979, for individuals entering
the sample at ages older than 17) and local unemployment rate in county of residence in 1979. For the construction of the
tuition variable see Cameron and Heckman (2001). Distance to college is constructed by matching college location data in
HEGIS (Higher Education General Information Survey) with county of residence in NLSY. State average blue collar wages
are constructed using data from the BLS. For a description of the NLSY sample see BLS (2001).
In 1980, NLSY respondents were administered a battery of ten achievement tests referred to as the Armed Forces Vo-
cational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) (See Cawley, Conneely, Heckman and Vytlacil (1997) for a complete description). The
math and verbal components of the ASVAB can be aggregated into the Armed Forces Qualiﬁcation Test (AFQT) scores.1
Many studies have used the overall AFQT score as a control variable, arguing that this is a measure of scholastic ability. We
argue that AFQT is an imperfect proxy for scholastic ability and use the factor structure to capture this. We also avoid a
potential aggregation bias by using each of the components of the ASVAB as a separate measure.
For our analysis, we use the random sample of the NLSY and restrict the
sample to 1161 white males for whom we have information on schooling, several parental background variables, test scores
and behavior. Distance to nearest college at each date is constructed in the following way: Take the county of residence of
each individual and all other counties within the same state. The distance between two counties is deﬁned as the distance
between the center of each county. If there exists a college (2 year or 4 year) in the county of residence where a person lives
then the distance to the nearest college (2 year or 4 year) variable takes the value of zero. Oth e r w i s ew ec o m p u t ed i s t a n c e
(in miles) to the nearest county with a college. Then we construct distance to nearest college at 17 by using the county of
residence at 17. However for people who were older than 17 in 1979 we use the county of residence in 1979 for the construction
of this variable.
Tuition at age 17 is average tuition in colleges in county of residence at 17. If there is no college in the county then average
tuition in the state is taken instead. For details on the construction of this variable see Cameron and Heckman (2001).Local labor market variables for the county of residence are computed using information in the 5% sample of the 1980
census. For each county group in the census we compute the local unemployment rate and average wage for high school
dropouts, high school graduates, individuals with some college and four year college graduates. We do not have this variable
for years other than 1980 so, for each county, we assume that it is a good proxy for local labor market conditions in all the
other years where NLSY respondents are assumed to be making the schooling decisions we consider in this paper.
We also use the variable log(annual labor earnings). We extract this variable from the NLSY79 reported annual earnings
from wages and salary. Earnings (in thousands of dollars) are discounted to 1993 using Consumer Price Index reported by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Missing values may occur here for two reasons: First, because respondents do not report earnings
for wages/salary, and second, because the NLSY becomes biannual after 1994 and prevents us from observing respondents
when they reach certain ages. For example, because NLSY79 was not conducted in 1995, we do not observe individuals born
in 1964 when they are 31 year-old. In this case we input missing values.
To predict missing log earnings between ages 19 and 35 and extrapolate from age 36 to age 65 we pool NLSY and PSID
data. From the latter, we use the sample of white males that are household heads and that are either high-school or college
g r a d u a t e sa c c o r d i n gt ot h ed e ﬁnition given above. This produces a sample of 3,043 individuals from PSID. To get annual
earnings, we multiply the reported CPI-adjusted (1993 =100) hourly wage rate by the annual hours worked and divide the
outcome by 1000. Then we take logs to have an NLSY-comparable variable. Similarly to NLSY, we generate the Mincerian
Experience according to the rule given above. We also generate dummy variables for cohorts. The ﬁrst (omitted) cohort
consists of individuals born between 1896 and 1905, the second consists of individuals born between 1906 and 1915, and so
on up to the last cohort which is made up of PSID respondents born between 1976 and 1985. We pool NLSY and PSID by
merging the NLSY respondents in the PSID cohort born between 1956 and 1965.
Let Yit denote log earnings of agent i at age t. For each schooling choice S, we model the earnings-experience proﬁle as
(1) Yia(S)=α + β0Xia + β1X2
ia + Dγ + εia
(2) εia = ηi + via
(3) via = ρvia−1 + κia
where X is Mincer Experience, D is a set of dummy variables that indicate cohort, ηi is the individual eﬀect, and κit is white
noise. In Table 2 we report the OLS estimates for α,β0,β1,γ,ρ based on the pooled data set.









where φia = 1(if individual i is observed at age a)Then, we can obtain an estimator of via by computing
ˆ via =ˆ εia − ˆ ηi
Now, given b via we can run equation (3) and then compute ρ. From this we obtain an estimator of κia according to
ˆ κia =ˆ via − ˆ ρˆ via−1
We can then predict earnings for missing observations for a g e s1 9t o3 5a n dp e r f o r mt h ee x t r a p o l a t i o nf r o m3 6t o6 5b y
computing for each individual
ˆ Yia(S)=ˆ α + ˆ β0Xia + ˆ β1X2
ia + Dˆ γ +ˆ εia
=ˆ α + ˆ β0Xia + ˆ β1X2
ia + Dˆ γ +ˆ ηi +ˆ ρˆ via−1 +ˆ κia
Note that to get ˆ εit we do not set ˆ κit equal to zero. Instead, we sample ten draws from its distribution and average them
for each individual, for each time period.
The next step is to get the present value of log earnings at age 19 for each agent. In order to do it we discount log earnings
at each period using a discount rate of 3%. For identiﬁcation purposes we then break each individual’s working-life in two
periods. The ﬁrst one goes from age 19 to age 29. The second period goes from age 30 all the way to age 65. This produces
a panel in which the ﬁrst observation for each agent is the present value of log earnings from age 19 to 29 and the second
is the present value of log earnings from 30 to 65. This means that lifetime present value of log earnings is just the sum of
these two components. Table 2b contains descriptive statistics for the present value of log earnings for the entire working-life
period and also for the two subperiods used in the analysis.Appendix C: Markov Chain Monte Carlo Simulation Methods
Due to the complex nature of the likelihood function we will rely on Markov Chain Monte Carlo techniques to estimate
the model. These are computer-intensive algorithms based on designing an ergodic discrete time continuous state Markov
chain with a transition kernel having invariant measure equal to the posterior distribution of the parameter vector ψ,s e e
Robert and Casella (1999) for details. In particular, we will be using the Gibbs sampling algorithm.2
We ﬁrst describe how the Gibbs sampler can be used to estimate models in the general set-up laid out in section 4. Let
ψs,a be parameters speciﬁc to the distribution of outcomes with schooling level s at age a,l e tψm be parameters speciﬁc
to the distribution of measurements, let ψc be parameters speciﬁc to the distribution of schooling choice and let ψθ be
parameters speciﬁc to the factor distributions. Let n be the number of observations. Let the outcome matrix over all ages
with schooling level s be Ys,i =( Y c
s,i,Y∗d
s,i ) and the vector of measurements is M.
















,“ i” denotes a subscript for individual i and










where Y =( Y1,...,Y¯ S).
In what follows the conditional posteriors that constitute the transition kernel of the Gibbs sampler will be derived.
Choice equations
Conditional on the factors we have
f(η,γ,ρ






















iη + γ0θi,1)f(η,γ).This is the posterior for a normal regression model with covariates Zi,θi and precision ﬁxed at one. With f(η,γ)
multivariate normal this is a multivariate normal distribution.






1(ci,j−1 <I i <c i,j)Di,j1(ci1 < ···<c i¯ s)f(ρ)
We sample ρs one at a time conditional on the ρ1,...,ρ s−1,ρ s+1,...,ρ¯ s. The conditional for ρs is
f(ρs
¯ ¯ ¯ρ−s,η,γ,ψ−(η,γ,ρ),θ) ∝
Y
i:si=s




1(Qi,sρs <I i <c is+1)
n Y
i=1
1(cis−1 < Qisρs <c is+1)f(ρ). (5)
As a prior for ρ we choose f(ρ)=
Q
s U(−B,B) where B = 1000, i.e., a uniform distribution with very large support.
Let Ks be the number of elements in Qs.W es a m p l eρhs,h=1 ,...,K s one at a time. The conditional for ρhs is a uniform
distribution with boundary points which can be derived from a series of inequalities. Without loss we can assume that Qihs
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where ˜ cis =
PKs
j=1,j6=h Qijsρjs. Hence ρhs is uniform with boundaries (g
hs, ¯ ghs).






















So we sample Ii, i =1 ,...,N, one at a time from truncated normals.
Measurement equations
The continuous measurement equations are of the form







Given Xm,i,j,θi this is a linear regression model. With multivariate normal priors on (β
c
m,j,α c
m,j) and a gamma prior on theprecision of εc
m,i,j this is in the form of the standard conjugate Bayesian linear regression model, with a conditional normal
distribution for β
c
m,j given the precision of εc
m,i,j and a gamma distribution for the precision conditional on β
c
m,j.
Let the last m − m1 elements of the measurement vector M be binary indices generated as
Md
j =1 ( M∗d
j ≥ 0),j = m1 +1 ,...,m.
































Second, the precision is not sampled but ﬁxed at one.
Outcome equations
Let Ys,a be the outcome vector at age a with schooling level s. Suppose both employment and wage outcomes are
modelled. Let Y c
s,a be the wage outcome and Y d
s,a the employment outcome. Also let Y ∗,d
s,a be the latent employment index.






for a person working.
















sampled as above (using multivariate normal and gamma priors).

























a,s,i,1 are both standard normal.




















































Both of these are normal regression models with the precision ﬁxed at one. The latent employment indices are sampled as in
the usual binary choice framework (see Albert and Chib (1993)).Factors
The conditional for θ factors into n conditionals for θ1,...,θn. To see what the conditional for θi is note that all
contributions of θi originate from linear regression models,
Ii − Z0
iη = γ0θi + εI,i, (choice model)
Mj − X0
m,i,jβm,j = α0
















This equation system is of the form
ˆ Yi = Aiθi + ui,




















We sample θik|{θij}j6=k one at a time from their respective conditionals which can be shown to be a mixture of normals with
updated (data dependent) mixture weights and parameters.






θi |µ ,j,τ ,j
¢
,i =1 ,...,n.
Conditional on θ we can treat the factors as known and update the mixture parameters (pk,µ k,τk). We follow the “group
indicator” approach in Diebolt and Robert (1994) and augment the parameter vector by a sequence of latent group indicators
deﬁned as gi = j if a θi,j originates from mixture component j. Conditional on the mixture group indicators the mixture
parameters are easily sampled and conditional on the mixture parameters the group indicators are simple multinomials. To
preserve identiﬁcation of intercepts we constrain the mixture to have mean zero using the method proposed in Richardson et
al., (2000).
The estimation of the structural models in section 7 are done as above with a few modiﬁc a t i o n s .T h ec h o i c em o d e li sa
probit so the cut point is c =0 ,a n dn oρ parameters are estimated. The cross equation restrictions are imposed as follows.
Let ˜ Yi =( V1,h,i,V 2,h,i,V 1,c,i,V 2,c,i,V i), i.e., the stacked outcomes under high school and college and the choice index. Wec a nt h e nw r i t et h em o d e la s
˜ Yi = Wiψ + Γθi + εi,
i = Xiω + αtestθi + εtest,
where ψ =
©
{¯ δ1,s,¯ δ2,s, ¯ β1,s, ¯ β2,s}s,δP,γ
ª
,a n dWi and the loading matrix Γ = Γ({¯ α1,s, ¯ α2,s}s,α P) are deﬁned appropriately.
This model is now in the form of the system described above and the required conditionals are derived as above.Appendix D: Mean Preserving Spread
For the model described in Section 7, assume that εa,s are independent and identically normally distributed within each
period:
εa,s ∼ N(0,σ2
s,1) for ages 19-29
εa,s ∼ N(0,σ2















lnYa,s = δa,s + X0βa,s + α0
a,sθ + εa,s + η1,s ∗ experiencea + η2,s ∗ experience
2
a = µa,s + εa,s
where
µa,s = δa,s + X0βa,s + α0




E(Ya,s|X,θ)=e x p ( µa,s)E[exp(εa,s)]
We can do a mean preserving spread at each age a by giving the individual knowledge of εa,s:















=e x p ( µa,s)E[exp(εa,s)]




































V = µ1,C + µ2,C − µ1,a − µ2,a − Zγ − α0
pθ − εp




2,a + Zγ − α0
pθ − εp +¯ ε1,C +¯ ε2,C −¯ ε1,a − ¯ ε2,a
In the end, the probability of going to college is simply given by
Pr(V> 0)
for the ﬁrst case and for the second case.
Pr(V 0 > 0)
T h ee x p e r i m e n tf o rt h ec a s ew h e r ew er e m o v eθ1 from the information set of the agent, keep age by age, when mean earnings
is constant is analogous to the one just described.References
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(∗) µs(Z) − µs−1(Z)=ϕ(Z)+cs−1
with µ1(Z) as an initial condition and that cs ≥ cs−1 for all s =1 ,...,¯ s. Changes in utilities across states are independent of
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ρj, where ρj ⊥ ⊥ ρj0(j 6= j0), ρj ⊥ ⊥ εW, ρj ⊥ ⊥ (Z,Q), ρj ≥ 0,ϕ(Z)=Z0η. This model is identiﬁed
under the assumptions in Cameron and Heckman (1998) even without any exclusion restrictions, so Qs can just include an
intercept. The proof is trivial. Normalize ρ1 =0 . From the ﬁrst choice we compute,
Pr(D1 =1|Z)=P r ( Z0η + εW ≤ c1)
so we can identify f(εW),a n dη up to scale σW,a s s u m i n gεW and the ρj have densities with respect to Lebesgue measure
and nonvanishing characteristic function in addition to other standard regularity conditions. We suppress the intercept in Z.
One cannot distinguish the intercept from c1. Proceeding to further choices we obtain
Pr(D1 + D2 =1 |Z)=P r ( Zη+ εW ≤ c2 + ν2)
=P r ( εW − ν2 ≤ c2 − Zη).
Therefore we can identify f(εW −ν2) and c2 up to scale σεW−ν2. The scale is determined by the ﬁrst normalization (relative to













by taking the ratio of the normalized η from the second choice probability
to the normalized ratio of η from the ﬁrst choice probability for any coordinate of η.D e ﬁne ψ(X) as the characteristic
function of X. From the assumed independence of εW and ν2, ψ(εW − ν2)=ψ(εW)ψ(−ν2). Therefore we can identify
ψ(εW − ν2)
ψ(εW)
= ψ(−ν2), and we can determine f(−ν2) from the convolution theorem adopting a normalization for σW.
Proceeding sequentially, we obtain Pr(D1 + D2 + D3 + ... + Dk =1|Z)=P r ( Zη+ εW ≤ ck + νk), and can identify ck and
f(νk) up to the normalization given in the ﬁrst step. From f(νk), we can use deconvolution to identify f(ρj),j=2 ,..,S.S e e
Hansen, Heckman and Mullen (2001) for further details and extensions to factor models. Nowhere in this analysis do we use
the assumption that Qs contains regressors.
20Other normalizations are possible. All require that there be at least three measurements on each factor, although we can
get by with only one dedicated measurement. Consider the following example (due to Salvador Navarro):Let L =5 ,K=2 .
g1 = θ1 + ε1,g 2 = λ21θ1 + θ2 + ε2
g3 = λ31θ1 + λ32θ2 + ε3,g 4 = λ41θ1 + λ42θ2 + ε4
g5 = λ51θ1 + λ52θ2 + ε5
Assuming nonvanishing covariances and factor loadings,
λ32 =
COV (g1,g 5)COV (g3,g 4) − COV (g3,g 5)COV (g1,g 4)
COV (g2,g 4)COV (g1,g 5) − COV (g1,g 4)COV (g2,g 5)
if λ22λ42λ51 − λ41λ52 6=0 .
Then
λ41 =
COV (g3,g 4) − COV (g2,g 4)λ32
COV (g1,g 3) − COV (g1,g 2)λ32
































s are assumed to have a distribution that is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure.
22Under separability, it is straightforward to replace Zη by ϕ(Z;η), but we do not do so in this paper.
23For a deﬁnition of measurable separability, see Florens, Mouchart and Rolin (1990), section 5.2. The key idea is that we
can vary each of the coordinates of the vector freely.
24This assumption can be relaxed. It only aﬀects certain normalizations.
25In the discussion of equation (21) we could have normalized the variances of the σ2
θi,i=1 ,...,K rather than the factor
loadings, although this would require the imposition of certain sign restrictions.






can be uncertain at the date decisions are made. Assuming that these factor loadings












,b u ti ta ﬀects the identiﬁability and interpretation of αP. A more general version of this model would postulate
two random variables θ and θ
∗. Agents act on θ
∗ and θ is the true value. It would be interesting to identify the joint
distributions of θ and θ
∗ under (e.g.) a rational expections assumption.
27The run time was about 122 minutes on a 1.2Ghz AMD Athlon PC.
28The distributions of the factors by schooling level are shown in Figures A1 and A2 on the website.
29The coeﬃcient estimates for the components of the model are available on request.
30If we consider net gains by subtracting costs the diﬀerence between college graduates and high school graduates will evenbe higher because costs are lower for college graduates.
31If the agent knows θ1, θ2, εcollege and εhighschool then he faces no uncertainty.
32These results are available on request from the authors, and are posted on the website.
33See the numbers posted at the website.
34We compute the compensation (which can be negative or positive) required by each individual to keep average earnings
the same after the uncertainty is reduced. Then we provide the individual with this compensation together with knowledge
of (¯ ε1,c,¯ ε2,c,¯ ε1,h,¯ ε2,h) and ﬁnally we compute the percentage of individuals who would change their schooling decision if
they had knowledge of (¯ ε1,c,¯ ε2,c,¯ ε1,h,¯ ε2,h) but had the same present value of earnings in each schooling level. We use the
procedure described at the end of Section 4 applied to each period to adjust utility for the eﬀects of mean preserving spreads
in earnings (see Appendix D at our website).
35This comes from a simulation available on request from the authors.
36We thank Edward Vytlacil for simplifying and clarifying the statements and proofs of all three theorems in this section.Figure 1
Density of Gross Utility




























All densities are estimated using a 100 point grid over the domain and a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth of 0.12.
Utility=Σa(1+0.03)a
log(Y      ) a,s
1
All densities are 
All densities are 
estimated using a 
100 point grid 
over the domain 
and a Gaussian 
kernel with 
bandwidth of 
























Factor and Normal Densities*
θ1
normal version of θ1
θ2
normal version of θ2
* Normal densities are defined to be normal with same mean and variance as the corresponding θ.
All densities are estimated using a 100 point grid over the domain and a Gaussian kernel with
bandwidth of 0.12.
variance = 0.3019
































* Counterfactual:E(Vc |C hoice=High S chool)
** Predicted:E(Vc |C hoice=C ollege)
All densities are estimated using a 100 point grid over the domain and a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth of 0.12.
Utility=Σa(1+0.03)a
log(Y      ) a,s
1
Figure 4































*E ( Vc-Vh|Choice=High School)
** E(Vc-Vh|Choice=College)









All densities are estimated using a 100 point grid over the domain and a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth of 0.12.
Utility=Σa(1+0.03)a
log(Y      ) a,s

















































All densities are estimated using a 100 point grid over the domain and a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth of 0.12.



















































All densities are estimated using a 100 point grid over the domain and a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth of 0.12.
1 PVh=Σa (1+0.03)a
Yh,aFigure 7


































All densities are estimated using a 100 point grid over the domain and a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth of 0.12.
1 PVh=Σa (1+0.03)a
Yh,a

























































All densities are estimated using a 100 point grid over the domain and a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth of 0.12.





































All densities are estimated using a 100 point grid over the domain and a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth of 0.12.
Utility=Σa(1+0.03)a
log(Y      ) a,s
1
Figure 10








































All densities are estimated using a 100 point grid over the domain and a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth of 0.12.
Utility=Σa(1+0.03)a





































































































































































































































































Variables deﬁned for all vP f Pg
Variables deﬁned for v\ f
v \ g
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(QUROOHGLQ6FKRRODW7HVW'DWH   <HV





Factor Loading Standard Error
Potential First Period 1 0.1419 0.0324
Utility in High School 2 10
Total Variance Proportion of Total Variance Explained by
0.3460 1 2
0.0351 0.8717
Potential Second Period 1 0.2277 0.0519
Utility in High School 2 1.6432 0.0262
Total Variance Proportion of Total Variance Explained by
0.8951 1 2
0.0349 0.8717
Potential First Period 1 0.1888 0.0559
Utility in College 2 0.9402 0.0676
Total Variance Proportion of Total Variance Explained by
0.3455 1 2
0.0634 0.7718
Potential Second Period 1 0.3908 0.0979
Utility in College 2 1.7217 0.1203
Total Variance Proportion of Total Variance Explained by
1.0860 1 1
0.0848 0.8241












Factor Loading Standard Error
Xf  Xk 1 0.2099 0.1553
2 0.0188 0.1786
Total Variance Proportion of Total Variance Explained by
0.1031 1 1
0.3027 0.0889
















Factor Loading Standard Error
Arithmetic Reasoning 1 10
Total Variance Proportion of Total Variance Explained by 1
0.7764 0.7391
Coding Speed 1 0.9672 0.0275
Total Variance Proportion of Total Variance Explained by 1
0.7340 0.7308
Math Knowledge 1 0.6313 0.0350
Total Variance Proportion of Total Variance Explained by 1
0.8049 0.2843
Word Knowledge 1 0.7508 0.0317
Total Variance Proportion of Total Variance Explained by 1
0.6193 0.5219
Paragraph Composition 1 0.8080 0.0345
Total Variance Proportion of Total Variance Explained by 1
0.7061 0.5301












Factor Loading Standard Error
Cost Function* 1 -2.1250 0.5042
2 -1.0278 0.3799
Total Variance Proportion of Total Variance Explained by
0.8951 1 1
0.0349 0.9096
Choice** 1 2.3349 0.4904
2 1.0466 0.4277
Total Variance Proportion of Total Variance Explained by
6.1544 1 1
0.5297 0.0604
*C o s t= s+s>11+s>22+%s=
** Choice = f>2+f>1k>2k>1+(f>2>1+f>1>1k>2>1k>1>1s>1)1+(s>2>2+s>1>2k>2>2k>1>2s>2)2s%s=










Total Variance of Cost=






Proportion of total variance explained by factor n is
(f>2>n+f>1>nk>2>nk>1>ns>n)22
n
Total Variance of Choice =Table 4
Average Gross Utility In Dierent States (Factual or
Counterfactual) For Persons Who Go To High School
or Who Go to College and for People At The Margin
(Does Not Include Utility “Cost” or Pyschic Returns to College)
Factual or Counterfactual High School1 College2 Utility for People
Schooling Level at Margin3
High School+ 7.8580 8.6125 8.2991
Std. Error 0.0604 0.0737 0.1363
College++ 7.7262 8.6885 8.3118
Std. Error 0.0638 0.0763 0.1413
1+ E(Vk | choice=high school) and 1++ E(Vf)|choice=high school)
2+ E(Vk | choice=college) and 2++ E(Vf |choice=college)
3+ E(Vk | V=0) and 3++ E(Vf |V=0)
Table 5
Factual and Counterfactual Returns for Persons
W h oG oT oH igh School, College, or Are At The Margin
(Does Not Include Utility Cost In College)
High School1 College2 Utility for People
Gross Return: at Margin3
College Vs. High School (Relative)+ -0.0180 0.0126 0.0059
Std. Error 0.1590 0.0178 0.0227
Net Returns:
College Vs. High School (Relative)++ -0.2398 0.3161 -0.0402
Std. Error 0.2502 0.3178 0.0077
College Vs. High School (Relative)+++ -0.4227 0.1892 -0.0416










We make the distinction between the second and third line in this table because in our
framework we cannot separate nonmonetary costs from nonmonetary benefits of going to
college, so we allocate ln P both ways.Table 6
Returns to College In Terms of
Lifetime Earnings Excluding Tuition For People
Who Go To H.S., College, or Are At The Margin
High School1 College2 Earnings for People
at Margin3
College vs. High School+ 0.4379 0.5764 0.5274
Std. Error 0.0228 0.0365 0.0634
Net Returns:
College vs. High School++ 0.4162 0.5607 0.5092









d(1/(1+0.03))dYd>m, that is, the interest rate is 3%
Earnings are measured in $1000s
Gross Returns:
Table 7
Percentage of People with Negative
Returns to College (Net and Gross)
Gross Net
Utility Earnings Utility Earnings
High School Graduates 56.22% 13.62% 95.91% 14.74%
College Graduates 39.66% 6.90% 8.32% 7.28%












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Variance(Vc-Vh) Variance(Vc) Variance(Vh) Correlation(Vc,Vh)
I =  0.5134 2.6462 2.3714 0.8990
I = {T2} 0.5036 0.5068 0.2632 0.3648
I = {T1,T2} 0.4824 0.3020 0.1804 0
Variance(Vc-Pc-Vh) Variance(Vc-Pc) Variance(Vh) Correlation(Vc-Pc,Vh)
I =  7.9354 12.7911 2.3714 0.6561
I = {T2} 7.5549 8.6418 0.2632 0.4476
I = {T1,T2} 4.4763 4.2959 0.1804 0
Variance(Yc-Yh) Variance(Yc) Variance(Yh) Correlation(Yc,Yh)
I =  2.68x105 7.69x10
5 2.70x10
5 0.8458
I = {T2} 1.18x105 1.30x105 2.36x105 0.3234
I = {T1,T2} 9.74x105 8.21x104 1.53x104 0
Variance(Yc-Tuition-Yh) Variance(Yc-Tuition) Variance(Yh) Correlation(Yc-Tuition,Yh)




I = {T2} 1.18x105 1.30x105 2.36x104 0.3232
I = {T1,T2} 9.73x104 8.20x104 1.53x104 0
Net Utility
Gross Present Value of Earnings
Net Present Value of Earnings
Table 9
Agent's Forecast Variance of High-School-College Returns Under Different 
Information Sets for the Agents
Gross Utility2ULJLQDO&KRLFH
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